This study examined the role of contingencies and experimental context in human decision making. Twelve subjects participated across a series of conditions that provided response alternatives of a small, high-probability reinforcer (non-risky alternative) or a larger, low-probability reinforcer (risky alternative). A range of reinforcer amounts and probabilities were used in a discrete trial design with repeated trials across multiple sessions. The conditions of this study more closely modeled studies with nonhumans responding for food than studies with humans making decisions about hypothetical monetary amounts. Consistent with previous data, subjl ects displayed a strong preference for the nonrisky response alternative, even when doing so resulted in lost earnings. The data support models of decision and risk that emphasize the subjective (rather than mathematically expected) value of reinforcers, and the data highlight the important role of reinforcement contingencies and context in risk-taking behavior.
driven substantially by consequences (Hamm & Shettleworth, 1987 , Herrnstein, 1997 Rachlin, Battalio, Kagel, & Green, 1981; Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986) . In the risk and decision-making literature, this tenet is supported by data from nonhuman studies. Because human studies typically employ hypothetical rather than real contingencies, effects of consequences on human risk taking are less clear.
Much is known about how people evaluate hypothetical outcomes in decision situations. The results of many studies indicate a tendency toward mild risk aversion in conditions of gain versus no-gain risks (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984; Silberberg, Murray, Christensen, & Asano, 1988; Siovic & Lichtenstein, 1968) . But few human studies have examined risky choices using · real consequences. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) reported, under some conditions, equivalent outcomes with real and hypothetical outcomes, but results from other studies are not so straightforward and suggest that there may be differences in subjects' decision making when real payoff contingencies are implemented. Siovic (1969) found that when choices were hypothetical, subjects maximized gains and discounted the probability of loss, but were more risk averse (sensitive to losses and no gain) under conditions in which they actually played out their choices. Rachlin and . Frankel (1969) employed a free operant procedure (concurrent VI) with five gambling situations. They found that under control conditions (feedback with no payoff contingencies) subjects were indifferent as to which response option they chose, but were highly sensitive to probabilities of winning and losing in a gambling condition in which real monetary gains were available.
In nonhuman studies, subjects choose between options with real consequences. It has been consistently demonstrated that if both options provide sufficient reinforcement (food) to sustain health, the consistent (non-risky) option will be preferred, but if both options provide less reinforcement than is necessary to survive, preference is towards the variable (risky) reward (Caraco, Martindale, & Whittam, 1980; Houston, 1991; Houston & McNamara, 1982) . These findings underscore the importance of investigating the role of contingencies and experimental context (e.g., motivational state) in decision making (see also Hastjarjo, Silberberg, & Hursh, 1990) .
Current theories of human risk taking assert that subjects psychologically transform expected (mathematical) values of choices into subjective values, and cho. ices are subsequently based on these subjective values (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 , 1984 . To highlight the differences between decision making based on subjective value versus mathematically expected value (amount x probability), it is possible to derive general quantitative predictions about response preferences. For example, Rachlin et al. (1986) noted the compatibility of subjective choice theories with behavioral theories of choice and suggested an equation that, under repeated-trials conditions, should describe risk-taking behavior patterns. Predictions for the present study were made based on the simplified equation:
(1 ) where A refers to monetary amounts, P to the probability of reinforcement, and subscripts 1 and 2 to the respective response options (for a detailed account of this model the reader is referred to Rachlin et aI., 1986) . The parameters sa and Sf designate individual sensitivities to amount and probability (or its equivalent in this context, rate 1 ). We set the exponents sa and Sf to 0.50 and 1.50, respectively, based on extensive previous data suggesting that subjects are undersensitive to amounts and oversensitive to probabilities/rates (e.g., de Villiers, 1977; Goodie & Fantino, 1995; Herrnstein, 1997; Kollins, Newland, & Critchfield, 1997; Rachlin et aI., 1986; Siovic & Lichtenstein, 1968) . This equation was employed not to test its utility as a model of risk taking, but rather as a descriptive tool, providing a standard upon which to judge the obtained data with respect to subjective versus expected values of the response options.
The present study was designed to add to the limited database on human risk taking involving consequences actually experienced by employing experimental procedures similar to those used in nonhuman studies. Subjects worked for real monetary outcomes. Consistent with Rachlin's (1988) suggestion that the fundamental behavioral unit of analysis in risk taking should be a series of choices made across time, subjects were exposed to numerous repeated trials in each condition. Motivation, defined as level of food deprivation, is carefully regulated in experiments in which nonhumans work for food rewards, but is typically unknown in studies of human risk taking. The present study sought to more directly address this variable by investigating unemployed participants who responded for money. Thus, earnings in the present study represented a primary source of income. By using several different reinforcer probabilities and amounts, we also intended to address the influence of these variables, particularly with regard to subjective versus expected value.
Method
Subjects. Adult participants were recruited via local newspaper ads. Potential participants were given extensive interviews covering physical and mental health status, and drug and alcohol use history. Exclusionary· criteria included (a) current medical problems (e.g., high blood pressure, diabetes, history of head injury with loss of consciousness> 15 minutes); (b) pregnancy; (c) current use of any medications; (d) current ongoing drug use; and (e) current or past history of an Axis I disorder other than past substance dependence, as defined by the Structured Clinical Interview (SCID-I-NP, Version 2, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) for the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) . Prior to entering the study, subjects were read, and then signed, a detailed consent form. After beginning the study, subjects were discontinued for providing positive drug or alcohol samples (confirmed by daily urine and expired air analysis) and for poor attendance (repeated failures to attend scheduled appointments at the laboratory). The final sample included 12 subjects (4 females, 8 males). None of the 12 subjects were otherwise employed while in the study.
Apparatus. During experimental sessions, subjects worked alone in a 1.2-x 1.8-m, sound-attenuating test chamber equipped with a 36.5-cm (14") VGA color monitor, and a 10.0-x 43.0-x 25.0-cm response panel with three Microswitch buttons labeled A, B, and C. Experimental events and data collection were handled by a remote PC and a Med Associates, Model 750 B, interface card, using custom software written in MicroSoft© Visual Basic.
Subject payment and daily schedule. Subjects were paid in three ways: (a) daily payments for performance during experimental sessions (described below); (b) weekly bonus payments for clean urine/breath samples and attendance; and (c) a completion bonus given at the end of the experiment. Each day of the study, subjects arrived at approximately 8:00 am. After collection of breath and urine samples, subjects participated in either five or six experimental sessions, lasting between 15 and 25 minutes (depending on the experimental condition) and beginning at 8:30, 9:30, 10:30, 11 :30 am, 1 :00, and 2:00 pm. Lunch was provided at 12:00 noon. Subjects were not allowed to eat any other food or smoke cigarettes between 8:00 am and 2:30 pm.
Instructions. Prior to testing on the first experimental day, subjects were read the following instructions:
Today you will partic~pate in a decision-making task. You will be able to earn money by working at a response console. During the regular sessions, the letters C and A will appear on the computer screen at the same time. When you see the letters appear, you may choose either one by pressing the corresponding button once on the response panel. When you make a selection, both letters will disappear, and the counter will show how much money you earned on that trial. Then, the screen will be blank. Wait until you see the letters reappear on the screen, which indicates a new trial, then make a selection (C or A). You only need to press the button once each trial. Do you have any questions? At the end of the session, a message will say "session over" and report how much money you earned that session.
During some conditions of the study (described below), subjects completed a short training period in which they were exposed to a limited number of forced-choice trials on each response option. Before the training period, a brief set of additional instructions preceded those shown above directing subjects to make a button press corresponding to the single letter shown on the screen.
Risk-taking task. The experimental tas~ was essentially a version of the stochastic two-armed bandit problem (see Krebs, Kacelnik, & Taylor, 1978) . A discrete-trial concurrent choice procedure was used; each response option required a single button press. Because reinforcement probability was stochastic, actual reinforcement frequencies could vary across subjects and experimental sessions. The task was intended to measure risk taking (or risk aversion) under conditions in which one response option provided a small monetary reward with a high probability of reinforcement (relative certainty), and the other option provided a much larger monetary reward with a much lower reinforcement probability (relative uncertainty). Table 1 shows the monetary amounts, reinforcement probabilities, and expected values (amount x probability) for all conditions in the study. During the task, the computer screen displayed the letters C and A near the bottom of the screen. Following a response on button C or A, both letters were removed from the screen, and a monetary counter appeared for 3 sec showing an amount of money earned on that trial (e.g., "$0.10:' or "$0.00" for any nonreinforced trials when p< 1.0). Next, all stimuli were removed, and the screen was blank during a 5-sec intertrial interval (ITI). Certain variations in stimulus display, monetary amounts or probabilities, and number of trials per session occurred across experimental conditions; these are described below. Because the response requirement was a single button press and the ITI was held constant at 5 sec across all conditions, subjects completed experimental sessions at approximately the same rate in each condition. Thus, speed of responding and session length could not influence subjects' performance.
Stability criteria. Data submitted to stability analyses were collapsed across a single 5-or 6-session experimental day. We used two quantitative criteria by which to judge behavior as stable: (a) the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean, see Snedecor & Cochran, 1980) had to be at or below 0.20; and (b) the mean of Sessions 1-3 subtracted from the mean of Sessions 4-5/6, divided by the overall mean of all 5/6 sessions had to be at or below 0.16 (see Perone, 1991) . Because these stability criteria are sensitive to small numbers, calculations were based on the number of responses made on the preferred response option for that day. For example, if a subject chose the non-risky option on 60% of all trials for that day, those data would be used to calculate stability. If the data did not meet both criteria, subjects were exposed to the same conditions until the data were stable (at least one additional experimental day). Subjects rarely needed more than two experimental days (10-12 sessions) to meet stability criteria for a given condition. Only data meeting both stability criteria were accepted as stable; these data constitute all tables and figures shown. The dependent measure of interest was the mean proportion of choices made on the risky (low probability) response option. Proportion was presented to normalize data across conditions with different numbers of trials per session.
Condition 1a. Four subjects completed this condition. Experimental sessions were composed of 25 trials. Subjects completed 5 sessions per day. On all trials, the C button provided $0.25 at a probability of 1.0 (nonrisky option), and the A button provided $1.00 at a probability of 0.25 (risky option). The two options were mathematically equivalent; the EV (amount x probability) on both response options was 0.25. Thus, a bias for the A button (> 50% of trials) was considered risk prone; a bias for the C button was considered risk averse.
Because reinforcement was probabilistic, programmed and realized probabilities could vary. To prevent erroneous judgments about reinforcement probabilities, prior to the first session all subjects completed a forced-choice, 20-trial training period in which only one response option was available at a time. The training period served to provide subjects with information regarding the monetary amounts and probabilities that would be in effect during regular experimental sessions. On Trials 1-10, only the letter C was displayed on the screen, and only response option C was available (pressing A had no effect). All 10 trials produced $0.25. During Trials 11-20 only the letter A was displayed on the screen, and only response option A was available. Three randomly dispersed trials out of the 10 produced $1.00. Regular sessions began immediately after the completion of the training period.
Conditions 2a, 2b, 2c. Four subjects completed these conditions. Experimental sessions were increased ·in length to 60 trials in order to give subjects more extended contact with reinforcement probabilities. Additionally, the pretraining session was increased from 20 to 100 trials (50 forced-choice trials on each response option). On Trials 1-50 only option C was available, and 40 of the 50 trials produced $0.15. On Trials 51-100 only option A was available, and 12 of the 50 trials produced $0.50. Thus, subjects earned $12 ($6 on each response option) during the 100-trial pretraining. Subjects completed six sessions per day. Three sets of parameters were used, shown in Table 1 . Across Conditions 2a, 2b, and 2c, the two options were again (nearly) equivalent. The difference in EV between the risky and non-risky option was .005 in Conditions 2a and 2b, and 0 in Condition 2c.
The experimental sequence followed an ABAC design. After meeting stability criteria in Condition 2a, subjects moved to Condition 2b, then back to 2a. In the second exposure to 2a, data were required not only to meet stability criteria, but in addition, the difference in the mean number of preferred choices during the first and second exposures divided by the overall mean for both exposures could not be greater than 0.16. This requirement was added to prevent against sequence effects tha. t may have been caused by linear decreases in reinforcement probability had the design sequence progressed: 2a -2b -2c. If choice proportions changed substantially from Condition 2a to 2b, and did not return to original levels upon return to Condition 2a, ' it would confound interpretation of performance during Condition 2c.
Conditions 3a, 3b, 3c. Four subjects completed these conditions.
Experimental sessions lasted 60 trials. Subjects completed six sessions per day. In an effort to increase subjects' sensitivity to reward amounts, no pretraining session was provided. Instead, monetary amounts available on each option were printed on the computer screen directly below the respective letters. Subjects were provided no preexperimental ·information regarding reinforcement probabilities. Three sets of parameters were used across an AABBACC design. These parameters are shown in Table 1 . Once the stability criteria were reached in Condition 3a, monetary amounts and probabilities on the two response buttons were switched (e.g., button C was now risky and button A non-risky). Although unlikely in normally capable adult subjects, the switching of values on the respective response options during each condition was added to test for the possibility of a response bias for one of the response buttons. After the switch, and in addition to meeting stability criteria, the difference in the mean number of preferred choices during the first and second exposures divided by the overall mean for both exposures could not be greater than 0.16. This requirement was instated to guard against either a bias or a changing trend toward one response option following the switching of response-option values. For example, if a subject chose button C (non-risky) on 75% of all trials in the first exposure to Condition 3a, but remained on button C (now risky) on 75% of all trials during the second exposure, data obtained during Condition 3b would be difficult to interp~ret. Unlike Conditions 1 and 2, in Conditions 3a, 3b, and 3c, a clear difference existed between the EVs on the two response options. In each of these three conditions, the EVs of the non-risky and risky options were 0.077 and 0.160, respectively. Thus, the risky option provided a decidedly greater monetary gain and should have been preferred if subjects were equally sensitive to both amounts and probabilities. for one of the response options; any data pOint above or below the 0.50 line indicates a preference for the risky or non-risky option, respectively. Under conditions in which the expected values were approximately equal, any combination of responding would produce roughly the same overall monetary gain. Thus, a preference for a given response option suggests a subjective bias for the risky or non-risky option. For purposes of comparison, all data in Figure 1 (obtained and predicted) are expressed as ratios between the response alternatives so that they can be presented as proportions ranging between 0 and 1. It is clear that, across all conditions, all but one subject preferred the non-risky response option. The single exception, 83, chose the risky option on every trial. Across all conditions of the study, subjects chose the risky alternative an average of 0.156 (SE = 0.035) of the trials. Because subjects in Conditions 3a-c were not exposed to forced-choice pretraining trials, their actual exposure to each of the response options could have been more variable and had an effect on response preferences. Across Conditions 3a, 3b, and 3c, the average obtained monetary amount per trial was $0.168 on the risky option (R) and $0. 078 on the non-risky option (NR) for 89; $0.177 (R) and $0.078 (NR) for 810; $0.160 (R) and $0.076 (NR) for 811; and $0.184(R) and $0.077 (NR) for 812. Importantly, these obtained values are highly similar to the programmed expected values shown in Table 1 .
Consistent with previous data, Figure 1 reveals that the mathematically expected value of the two options had little bearing on actual response preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Machina, 1987; Siovic & Lichtenstein, 1968) , as expected values were unrelated to response patterns. Equation 1, which reflects the subjective value of response options based on the relative influence of reinforcer amount and probability, conSistently reflected risk-aversive response patterns across experimental conditions, and it was modestly accurate in describing individual subject data. The largest discrepancy occurred in Condition 3a, where Equation 1 substantially overestimated the proportion of risk-taking responses. Notably, it is evident that reinforcer amounts were greatly undervalued in relation to reinforcement probabilities, particularly across Conditions 3a-c. Additional individual subject data for each condition are shown in Appendix A, including number of trials per session, number of sessions per day, the mean and standard deviation for the preferred response option, and indication of whether that preference was for the risky or non-risky option.
Discussion
Twelve subjects worked on a decision-making task with two alternatives: (a) a small reward at a high probability of reinforcement (nonrisky option), and (b) a larger reward at a. much smaller reinforcement probability (risky option). Repeated trials and sessions, real monetary payoffs, and subjects' unemployment more closely approximated conditions typically used with nonhumans. All but one subject showed a ' strong preference for the non-risky alternative. This outcome is consistent with previous nonhuman and human data, but the extent to which subjects were risk averse is greater than expected based on previous human studies. Mathematically expected values were unrelated to response preferences, but an equation that weighted the subjective value of reinforcer amounts and probabilities accurately described subjects' risk-averse response patterns, revealing that probability exerted substantially more control over responding than amount.
Under the conditions used in this study, subjects tended to be extremely risk averse, more so than the response preferences usually found with human subjects making decisions about hypothetical monetary amounts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 , 1984 Silberberg et al., 1988; Siovic, 1969) . For example, even under conditions in which the risky choice potentially offered a substantially larger overall gain (Conditions 3a, 3b, and 3c), subjects' choices continued to be controlled by reinforcement probability more than amount. Most studies typically present unique pairs of alternatives on each trial and use a limited number of trials. Data are evaluated by group preferences rather than single-subject preferences across multiple trials. Because of these differences, direct comparisons are difficult. It is however clear that, in both methodological approaches, human subjects tend to be risk averse to low probability alternatives. This phenomenon has been recognized for some time, "probabilities are more important than payoffs; the latter are considered only when probabilities are similar" (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968, p. 5) . This factor may be a particularly salient factor when real monetary payoffs are involved. In hypothetical approaches, context is manipulated linguistically by framing the manner in which the alternatives are presented (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) ; which may not be equivalent to presenting real consequences. This possibility is bolstered by earlier studies of risk taking employing real consequences (Rachlin & Frankel, 1969; Siovic, 1969) . However, if human subjects do in fact respond differently under conditions like those used in this study, the difference may well be quantitative rather than qualitative, with response patterns still being risk averse.
Because the methods of this study resemble those of nonhuman studies, a brief comparison is warranted. Subjects were presented with many rep~ated trials under each experimental condition, an experimental approach used almost exclusively in nonhuman studies, but less often in studies with humans. This provides greater assurance in measuring stable response preferences over time, an important feature in the measurement of risk taking (Rachlin, 1988) . Previous nonhuman studies that presented small, frequent versus larger, less frequent reinforcers have found a preference for the small, non-risky alternative (Hamm & Shettleworth, 1987; Houston & McNamara; 1982; Real, 1991) , except under conditions of extreme deprivation (Caraco et aI., 1980) . Under repeated-trials conditions, both pigeons (Hamm & Shettleworth, 1987) and bumblebees (Real, ' 1991) increased risk-aversive response preferences as a function of reinforcer variability (e.g., as probability decreased), even though the mean available amount (e.g., expected value) remained equal for both options. Real (1991) has argued that, in some species, response strategies that allow for efficient exploitation of available food resources may also produce poor perception of probabilities. Subjects in our experiment earned an average of $34.46 per day (plus weekly bonuses). We can only speculate about whether reinforcer amounts, probabilities, and intake were roughly similar in value to those experienced by nonhuman subjects in the above-noted experiments. However, under similar experimental conditions, the preference for a "sure" but small alternative observed in this study is consistent with the nonhuman data described above. An intriguing comparative study would involve first scaling food and monetary reinforcers between species (perhaps through the use of a concurrent VI-VI design where quantitative parameters of responding are well known in both species), then parametrically evaluating the effects of amount and probability using analogous experimental designs.
Methodological limitations of this study necessarily temper the conclusions. Although the data suggest that probabilities uniformly exerted greater control over responding than amounts, each condition of the study manipulated both probabilities and amounts simultaneously. This was done primarily to keep EVs (or mean value) of the two options equal across conditions. Because amount was not systematically varied while holding probability constant (or vice versa), comparison of the relative influence of both factors is possible only in a global manner.
A related issue concerns subjects' ongoing interaction with reinforcement probabilities. Subjects were not provided specific information about probabilities. We did provide forced-choice training, and analysis of data in Conditions 3a, 3b, and 3c revealed that subjects' exposure to each option was nearly identical to the programmed expected value. Thus it is unlikely that actual contingencies varied significantly from those scheduled in each condition. However, because humans are not good estimators of probability, and because discrepancies in probabilities were generally quite large between the two alternatives, the subjective value of the alternatives may have been quite discrepant from the obtained value. Specifically, once subjects had adopted a highly risk-averse response pattern they may have had little sensitivity to changes in the value of the risky option. The data could therefore represent a response pattern to a single global set of values (small amount/high probability versus large amount/lower probability) rather than unique response strategies to each of the conditions; an unlikely response strategy in experimental designs that verbally present the reinforcement probabilities for each option.
In the investigation of risk-taking, there are at least two advantages to experimental approaches like the one used here. First, repeated-trials exposure to amounts and probabilities allows for comparative work between species, because verbal descriptions of reinforcement probabilities are of little value with nonhuman subjects. Second, it provides general comparisons to some real-world decisions with which humans are commonly faced, where real consequences are at stake and choices must be made repeatedly over time. For example in highly volatile systems like the stock market and international military struggle, decision makers are repeatedly presented with multiple alternatives having different levels of risk and payoff. Rarely are the outcome probabilities known under these circumstances, yet individuals are faced with making choices among alternatives-sometimes on a daily basis. One necessary task for future risk-taking studies will be to directly compare risk-taking behavior under conditions in which probabilities and amounts are known and hypothetical with those forcing exposure to response alternatives through repeated trials and contact with real consequences. 
